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Abstract
In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to
determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to
the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily influence
the outcome of the auction.
The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we demonstrate how
to apply machine learning techniques to solve the optimal ordering problem in
sequential auctions. We learn regression models from historical auctions, which
are subsequently used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions.
Given the learned models, we propose two types of optimization methods: a black-
box best-first search approach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned
models to integer linear programs (ILP) which can then be solved by any ILP-
solver. Although the studied auction design problem is hard, our proposed opti-
mization methods obtain good orderings with high revenues.
Our second main contribution is the insight that the internal structure of re-
gression models can be efficiently evaluated inside an ILP solver for optimization
purposes. To this end, we provide efficient encodings of regression trees and lin-
ear regression models as ILP constraints. This new way of using learned models
for optimization is promising. As the experimental results show, it significantly
outperforms the black-box best-first search in nearly all settings.
1 Introduction
One of the main challenges of mathematical optimization is to construct a mathematical
model describing the properties of a system. When the structure of the system cannot
be fully determined from the knowledge at hand, machine learning and data mining
techniques have been used in optimization instead of such models.They have, for ex-
ample, been used as decision values [1], fitness functions [2], or model parameters [3].
To the best of our knowledge, so far models learned by data mining or machine learn-
ing have only been used for optimization in a black-box manner, e.g., using only the
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predictions of learned models but not their internal structure. In contrast to such black-
box approaches, in this paper, we develop a novel white-box optimization method, that
is, we map entire models to a set of integer linear programming constraints such that
the internal structure of the models is used during problem solving. The proposed
white-box method together with a black-box method also provide a solution to an op-
timization problem of key interest to the artificial intelligence and operations research
communities: auction design. We briefly introduce this domain before going into the
details of our methods.
1.1 Sequential auction design
Auctions are becoming increasingly popular for allocating resources or items in business-
to-business and business-to-customer markets. Often sequential auctions [4] are adopted
in practice, where items are sold consecutively to bidders. Sequential auctions are
in particular desirable when the number of items for sale is large (e.g., flower auc-
tions [5]), or when the buyers enter and leave the auction dynamically (e.g., online
auctions [6]). In a sequential auction, an auctioneer may tune several auction param-
eters to influence the outcome of an auction, such as reserve prices for items and in
which order to sell them. In other words, (s)he can design auctions for the purpose of
achieving some predefined goal. In this paper, we solve one specific auction design
problem, namely, deciding the optimal ordering of items to sell in a sequential auction
in order to maximize the expected revenue (OOSA in short). We assume bidders in
such auctions are budget constrained. This is a highly relevant problem in today’s auc-
tions since bidders almost always have limited budget, as seen for instance in industrial
procurement [7]. Previous research has shown that with the presence of budget con-
straints, the revenue collected by the auctioneer is heavily dependent on the ordering
of items to sell [8, 9, 10]. This holds already for a toy problem with 2 items. Let us use
a simple example to illustrate the importance of ordering in such cases.
Example 1 Two agents A1 and A2 take part in a sequential auction of items. For sale
are items r1 and r2. The values of these items for the agents are given as follows:
vA1(r1) = 5, vA1(r2) = 6, vA2(r1) = 0, vA2(r2) = 5. In addition, both A1 and A2
have a budget limit of 5. Assume the reserve prices (i.e., the lowest price at which the
auctioneer is willing to sell) for both items are 4.
Suppose the items are sold by means of first-price, English auction1. We assume
a simple bidding strategy in this example. Each agent Aj’s reservation price (i.e., the
highest price j is willing to pay) for item ri is vAj (ri) − 1. Agents bid myopically on
each item, i.e., they will bid up to their reservation price, if their budgets allow.2 The
auctioneer’s goal is to maximize the revenue, i.e., the total sold price of the items.
Consider one situation where the auctioneer sells first r2 and then r1. A1 will get
r2 when she bids 5, and r1 will not be sold since A2 is not interested in it and A1 is out
of budget. The total revenue is 5. However, if the selling sequence is (r1, r2), A1 will
1The English auction that we consider is the one where the starting price is the reserve price, and bidders
bid openly against each other. Each subsequent bid should be higher than the previous bid, and the item is
sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to her bid.
2We will discuss different bidding strategies in Section 5.
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win r1 with the reserve price 4, and then A2 will win r2 with price 4. The collected
revenue is 8 in this case. 2
Most of the current approaches to the ordering problem in sequential auctions as-
sume a very restricted market environment. They either study the problem of ordering
two items, see [11, 12], or a market with homogeneous bidders [13]. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to consider how to order items for realistic auction settings
with many heterogeneous bidders competing for many different items. This problem is
highly complex—a good design on ordering needs to take care of many uncertainties
in the system. For instance, in order to evaluate the revenue given an ordering, the
optimization algorithm needs to know the bidders’ budgets and preferences on items,
which is usually private and unshared. Furthermore, the large variety of possible bid-
ding strategies that bidders may use in auctions are unknown. This auction design
problem is a typical example where the mathematical optimization model cannot be
fully determined, and hence, machine learning and data mining techniques can come
into play. This is exactly what our approach builds upon.
1.2 Learning models for white-box and black-box optimization
Nowadays more and more auctions utilize information technology, which makes it pos-
sible to automatically store detailed information about previous auctions along with
their orderings and the selling price per auctioned item. Our approach to solving the
problem of optimal ordering for sequential auctions starts with the historical auction
data. We define and compute several relevant features and then use them to learn re-
gression trees and linear regression models for the expected revenue. Given the models,
we propose two approaches to find the optimal ordering for a new set of items: (1) a
best-first search that uses the models as a black-box to evaluate different orderings of
the items; and (2) a novel white-box optimization method that translates the models
and the set of items into a mixed-integer program (MIP) and runs this in an ILP-solver
(CPLEX). Figure 1 displays the general framework of our approaches using these two
optimization methods.
Just like the traditional black-box optimization approach (see, e.g. [14, 15]), our
best-first search is ignorant of the internal structure of the models and only calls it to
perform function evaluations, i.e., predicting the revenue of an ordering of the items.
Optimization is possible by means of a search procedure that uses heuristics to produce
new orderings depending on previously evaluated ones. Our best-first search makes
use of dynamic programming cuts inspired by sequential decision making in order to
reduce the search space.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the realization that learned models can
be evaluated efficiently inside modern mathematical optimization solvers. This eval-
uation includes the computation of feature values (the input to machine learning), the
evaluation of these features using a learned model (the output from machine learning),
and a possible feedback from such evaluations to new features. In this paper, we effi-
ciently translate all of these steps for two types of learned models (regression trees and
linear regression models) into mixed-integer constraints. The resulting mixed-integer
program can then be evaluated in any modern integer linear programming (ILP) solver.
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Figure 1: Solving OOSA using white-box optimization and black-box optimization
with learned models. Black-box optimization only calls the predictive model to evalu-
ate possible orderings. White-box optimization translates the internal structure of the
predictive model to MIP constraints.
We call the resulting method white-box optimization with learned models.
In this way, modern exact solvers can be used instead of a heuristic search. These
solvers use (amongst others) advanced branch-and-bound methods to cut the search
space, compute and optimize a dual solution, and can prove optimality without testing
every possible solution. This is the main benefit of using the white-box method over a
black-box one. The downside, however, is that when the learned model is complex, the
white-box method may lead to a large mathematical model that is difficult to optimize.
We compare these two approaches and investigate this trade-off by applying them to
the OOSA problem.
Contributions and organization Although we use sequential auction design to il-
lustrate our method, all of our constructions are general and can be applied to any opti-
mization setting where unknown relations can be represented using regression models
that have been learned from data. The only constraint for using the white-box method is
that the feature values need to be computable using integer linear functions from inter-
mediate solutions. Our approach can thus be applied to complex optimization settings
where entire orders, schedules, or plans need to be constructed beforehand.
We list our contributions as follows:
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• We demonstrate how to apply regression methods from machine learning to
OOSA.
• We give an efficient encoding of regression trees and linear regressors into MIP
constraints.
• We prove OOSA with budget constrained bidders to be NP-hard, also when using
these regression models.
• We provide the first method that tackles OOSA in realistic settings.
• We automate the construction of mathematical models using machine learning.
In Section 2, we formally introduce the problem of optimal ordering for sequential
auctions (OOSA), and then we show how to learn regression models from historical
auction data in Section 3 using standard machine learning methods. Based on the
learned models, our white-box optimization method and a black-box optimization are
introduced to find the optimal ordering for OOSA in Section 4. Extensive experiments
are presented in Section 5 where we compare the performance of the two proposed
optimization methods using both the learned models and the auction simulator. Before
we conclude, we compare and discuss more related works in Section 6.
2 Optimal ordering for sequential auctions OOSA
We assume there is a finite set of bidders (or agents). Let R = {r1, . . . , rl} denote
the collection of the item types, and the quantity of each item type can be more than
1. When it is clear from the context, we will slightly abuse the notation and use I =
{r1, r2 . . . , r1, . . .} to denote the multiset of all available items. Each bidder agent i
has a valuation (or preference) for each type of item vi : R → R+. In addition, each
agent has a budget bi on purchasing items, and (s)he desires to win as many items as
are being auctioned within the budget limit.
In one auction, a set of items I with type set R′ ⊆ R will be auctioned sequen-
tially using a predetermined order. For example, given types r1 and r2 with quantities
of 1 and 2 respectively, there are three possible orderings of resources: (r1, r2, r2),
(r2, r1, r2), and (r2, r2, r1). For each rj that is being auctioned, agent i puts a bid on
rj based on its valuation function if its remaining budget allows. The agent who bids
highest on rj wins rj . This sequential auction ends when all items have been auctioned,
or when all agents run out of their respective budgets.
We assume that such an auction is repeated over time, and each auction sells pos-
sibly different items I . At the end of each auction, we have the following information
at our disposal: (1) the ordering of auctioned items; and (2) the allocation of items to
agents with their winning bids. The optimization problem we study is: given a set of
items and budget constrained bidders, finding an optimal ordering of items in sequen-
tial auctions such that the expected revenue is maximized. We call it OOSA. We now
show that the decision version of this optimization problem is NP-hard, even if we have
complete information on bidders’ preferences and they are not strategic (i.e., they bid
truthfully according to their true preferences).
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Theorem 1 Given a set of items R, preferences vi : R → R+, and budgets bi for
every bidder i. The problem of deciding whether there exists an ordering that obtains
a revenue of at least K ∈ R+ is NP-hard.
Proof 1 By reduction from the well-known NP-hard partition problem [16]: Given
a set of integers I = {i1, . . . , in}, is I dividable into two sets A and B such that∑
A =
∑
B? We need two bidders with preferences such that v1(rk) = 2 · ik and
v2(rk) = 2 · ik+1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The reserve price for each item k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is ik.
The agents’ budgets are b1 = 12
∑
I and b2 =
∑
I . The set of items R is {r1, . . . , rn}
and K is 32
∑
I . We claim that I is partitionable into two sets with equal sums if and
only if there exists an ordering that obtains a revenue of K (or more).
(⇒) Given a partition of I into sets A and B, we sell all items in A first, and
those in B later. In this case, agent 2 will buy all items in A with price 2 · ik as it is
the minimal bid to win the items from agent 1. After buying all items in A, agent 2
will have spent 2 ·∑ik∈A ik, which makes ∑ I in total (since ∑ik∈A ik = 12∑ I).
This is the entire budget of agent 2. All items in B are then sold to agent 1 with the
reserve price ik. Thus agent 1 pays
∑
ik∈B ik =
1
2
∑
I . This makes a total revenue of∑
I + 12
∑
I = 32
∑
I = K.
(⇐) Suppose we have an ordering such that agent 1 and 2 spend all of their budget
(K in total). This means that agent 2 wins the first set of items A, each costing 2 · ik
till it uses all its budget. Thus we have 2 ·∑k∈A ik = ∑ I , i.e., ∑k∈A ik = 12∑ I .
Agent 1 pays ik for the remaining items in B, B = I \ A, and it uses all its money:∑
k∈B ik =
1
2
∑
I . Hence, we have a partition of I where
∑
A =
∑
B.
The construction is clearly polynomial time.
Several related works deal with this type of ordering optimization problem. For
example, in the Economics literature, the authors of [11] investigate the optimal order-
ing strategy for the case where the auctioneer has two items to sell. They show that
when the items are different in value, the higher valued items should be auctioned first
in order to increase the seller’s revenue. Pitchik [12] points out that in the presence
of budget constraints, in a sealed-bid sequential auction, if the bidder who wins the
first good has a higher income than the other one, the expected revenue is maximized.
With these greatly simplified auction settings, it is possible to derive bidders’ equilib-
rium bidding strategies. Hence, with some assumptions on the distributions of bidders’
budgets and valuations of items, the optimal ordering can be theoretically derived.
However, as real-world auctions are much more complex and uncertain in terms of the
sizes of items/bidders, agents’ preferences and bidding strategies, these existing results
cannot be applied. In this paper, we instead focus on learning the overall behaviors of
the group of bidders from historical auction data by machine learning techniques, as
the first step of solving OOSA.
In order to apply ML techniques, we assume in every sequential auction the set of
participating bidders and their characteristics (preferences, budgets, bidding strategies)
to be similar. This simplifies the problem of learning a good ordering. Instead of learn-
ing the individual valuations/budget/bidding strategies of agents, we can treat the agent
population as a single entity for which we need to find a single global function. Obvi-
ously, such an approach will fail if the agents are radically different in every auction.
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However we consider this assumption sensible in many auction settings such as indus-
trial procurement auctions where the same companies repeatedly join the auctions with
similar interests, and the Dutch flower auction where there can be different bidders ev-
ery day, but it seldom occurs that one day bidders are only interested in roses and the
next day they only want tulips. Although the different participants can be interested in
different item types, the interests of the group of participants remain stable.
3 Learning predictive models for OOSA
At the end of each sequential auction, we have the following information at our dis-
posal: (1) the ordering of auctioned items; and (2) the revenue of each sold item. We
need to find a suitable way to model the expected revenue of such orderings. An order-
ing can be thought of as a sequence of items. However, to the best of our knowledge
none of the existing sequence models fit our auction setting, see also Section 6.2. What
comes closest to our auction setting are models such as Markov decision processes
(MDPs) [17]. These directly model the expected price per item and come with meth-
ods that can be used to optimize the expected total reward (revenue). However, an
implementation of the auction design problem as an MDP is not easy. We discuss this
in more detail in Section 6.2.
3.1 A regression model for OOSA
Instead of representing our problem with a sequence model such as an MDP, we view
the prediction of an auction’s outcome as a regression problem. We split this problem
into the subproblems of predicting the value of the auctioned items. We then sum these
up to obtain the overall objective function:
V (r1 . . . rn) =
∑
1≤k≤n
R(rk, {rj | j < k}, {rl | k < l}),
where R(rk, J, L) is a regression function that determines the expected value of rk
given that J was auctioned before andLwill be auctioned afterwards. The main benefit
of this representation is that modern machine learning methods can be used to learn this
function R from data. In addition, since every item sold represents a single sample,
every auction contains many samples that can be used for learning, further reducing
the amount of required data.
3.2 The regression functions
In this paper, we use regression trees [18] and least absolute shrinkage and selection
operator (LASSO) [19] as regression functions, and train them using features based on
the items auctioned before and after the current item. We first briefly introduce these
regressors.
Regression trees are a form of decision trees where the predicted values are real
numbers. A decision tree is one of the most popular predictive models for mapping
feature values to a target value. It is a tree-shaped graph with a root node, interior
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nodes, and leaf nodes. The root and every interior node contains a Boolean test for a
specific feature value f , such as f > 5. Every leaf node contains an output value v.
It maps the feature values to an output by performing all the tests along a path from
the root to a leaf. For every test performed, if the outcome is true (f > 5), the path is
continued along the left branch, if the outcome is false (f ≤ 5), the path is continued
along the right branch. Once a leaf is reached, it outputs the value it contains v.
A regression tree learner aims to find a tree that minimizes the mean squared error
of the predicted and the actual observed values. Most regression tree learning algo-
rithms follow a greedy strategy that splits interior nodes as long as the decrease in error
is significant. A split replaces one leaf node by an interior node connected with two
new leaf nodes. The interior node receives as Boolean constraint one that minimizes
the mean-squared error of the resulting tree, where the leaf nodes predict the mean
value of all observed data values that end up in that leaf after mapping all data samples
to leaf nodes.
LASSO is a method for constructing a linear regression function v(f1, . . . , fm) =
c1f1 + c2f2 + . . . + cmfm + d, where v is the value to predict, ci are constants,
fi are feature values, and d is the intercept. The standard approach to find such a
function is to minimize the mean squared error, which is easy to compute. LASSO is a
popular regularized version of this simple estimation that penalizes the absolute values
of the regression coefficients c1, . . . , cm. Formally, given a dataset of features fdi and
target values vd, with 1 ≤ d ≤ k where k is the number of samples, it uses convex
optimization in order to find a regression function that solves the following problem3:
min
∑
1≤d≤k
1
2 · k (v(f
d
1 , . . . , f
d
m)− vd)2 + α ·
∑
1≤i≤m
|ci|
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter for the effect of the regularization. Intuitively, the
larger α, the larger the penalty of having large coefficients ci. Consequently, a larger
value of α will drive more coefficients to zero. LASSO is a useful method when there
are several correlated feature values, which could make an ordinary least squares model
overfit on these values. We use LASSO regression because more zero coefficients
implies we need to compute less feature values in order to evaluate the learned model,
which has a positive effect on the optimization performance that we will discuss in
Section 4.
Currently, we provide the following features for these two regression models:
Feature 1: sold For every item type r, the amount of r items already auctioned.
Feature 2: remain For every item type r, the amount of r items still to be auctioned.
Feature 3: diff For every pair of item types r and r′, the difference between the
amount of r and r′ items already auctioned.
Feature 4: sum For every item type r, the amount of value obtained from auctioning
r items, and the overall sum.
3This is the version implemented in the scikitlearn Python package [20], which we use to learn the
models.
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Table 1: The data set created from the past two auctions {r1, r2} and {r2, r1} in Ex-
ample 2.
type value soldr1 soldr2 diffr1r2 sumr1 sumr2 sum index
r1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
r2 4 1 0 1 4 0 4 2
r2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
r1 0 0 1 -1 0 5 5 2
soldr2 ≤ 0.5
Type r1
predict 4
leaf 1
predict 0
leaf 2
yes no
soldr1 ≤ 0.5
Type r2
predict 5
leaf 1
predict 4
leaf 2
yes no
Figure 2: Two regression trees for the two item types from Example 2.
Feature 5: index For every item, the index at which it was auctioned.
Other sequential features such as sliding windows and N-grams can of course be
added to the model. However, since our white-box method computes these values
inside an ILP solver, the only requirement is that they can be represented using an
integer linear formulation. Although the diff feature can be determined using the
first, we add it for convenience of learning a regression tree, which requires many
nodes to represent such values. The influence of budget constraints is only directly
modeled by the fourth feature: once the amount paid for r1 items reaches a certain (to
be learned) bound, we can expect all agents that only want r1 items to be out of budget.
Although, there only exists an indirect relation between the budget constraints and the
first three features, including them can be beneficial and these are easier to compute. If
used by the regression model, these features thus reduce the time needed to solve the
auction design problem. For similar reasons, we add the last feature. Below we give an
example of how an ordering and its obtained values is transformed into a data set using
these 5 types of features.
Example 2 Consider the setting of Example 1. Assume two auctions have been carried
out. One sold r1 first and then r2. The other reversed. As shown in Example 1, the
first auction would obtain a revenue of 8, and the second auction would receive 5. We
compute feature values from these two auctions as depicted in Table 1. Subsequently,
we learn regression trees for both item types r1 and r2, as shown in Figure 2.4
After learning these regression trees, we can optimize the ordering for a new (un-
seen) multiset of items {r1, r2, r2, r2} by trying all orderings and choosing one with
maximum expected revenue: r1r2r2r2 gives 4 + 4 + 4 + 4 = 16, r2r1r2r2 gives
5 + 0 + 4 + 4 = 13, r2r2r1r2 gives 5 + 5 + 0 + 4 = 14, and r2r2r2r1 returns
4The learned linear regression model is more straightforward. Hence we skip such an example here.
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5 + 5 + 5 + 0 = 15. Hence, the optimizer will choose to schedule the r1 item before
all r2 items. In general, trying all possible orderings will be impossible: for a multiset
of items S = {r1, . . . , rn} of n types, there are a total of |S|!∏
1≤i≤n |{ri|ri∈S}|! unique
orderings, which blows up very quickly. 2
3.3 Modeling power and trade-off
Our method of regression modeling allows the use of any regression method from
machine learning for predicting unknown quantities in optimization, such as objective
values and parameters. In addition, since the regression function R uses other values
in a (proposed) solution as input (J, L) instead of only external parameters/data, a
learned regression model represents unknown relations between the different values
in a solution. The model thus answers the question “What is the value of X given
that we do Y?”, as opposed to “What is the value of X?” that is answered by fitting
only model parameters. Answering the first question allows for many more interesting
possibilities. For instance, one could use stochastic optimization with fitted parameters
to produce a schedule, use regression models to predict the effect of this schedule on the
parameters, and use stochastic optimization again on the newly estimated parameters.
This way, one can use machine learning tools to plan further ahead. Using our white-
box method, this can even be done using a single call to the optimization software.
This loop-back functionality provides a lot of power to our method, but also comes
with a risk. Every time the predictive models are used there is a probability that the pre-
dictions are inaccurate. When using a loop-back, these possible inaccuracies influence
all future predictions that depend on it. These future predictions are thus more inac-
curate and the predicted overall objective value can potentially diverge from the true
value. These cascading inaccuracies are an issue, however, the added modeling power
makes up for it. We make use of it in the sum feature, which relates the predicted
value to the predictions of earlier auctioned items. This feature is very important for
predicting budget constraints, and consequently is often used by the regression models
to produce predictions.
4 White-box and black-box optimization for OOSA
Given the predictive models for the expected value per item, it is not straightforward
to compute a good ordering as we already showed in Example 2. For a given ordering,
we can predict the individual revenues of items using the regression model, and sum
these up to obtain the revenue of the ordering. However, testing all possible orderings
and choosing the one with the highest revenue will take a very long time. For instance,
when we want to order 40 items of 8 types (the experimental setting in Section 5) with
5 of every type, we will need to test 40!5!8 ≈ 1.9 · 1031 possible unique orderings.
In A, we also provide hardness results that demonstrate there is little hope (unless
P = NP) of finding an efficient (polynomial time) algorithm that gives the optimal
ordering for any regression tree or linear regression predictor. In general, we cannot do
better than performing a guided search through the space formed by all possible order-
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ings. We present two such search-based optimization methods: (1) a novel “white-box”
optimization (i.e., ILP model), and (2) a “black-box” heuristic (i.e., best-first search).
4.1 White-box optimization: an ILP model
Given regression tree and linear regression models for the expected value per item type,
we automatically formulate the problem of finding an optimal ordering as a mixed
integer linear program (MIP). We discuss the encoding of a sequential auction, feature
values, objective function, and translating the learned models (regression tree and linear
regression respectively) below.
Ordering an auction Given a multiset I of n items, each from a set of possible
types R, we use the following free variables to encode any possible ordering of I:
xi,r ∈ {0, 1}. Item i is of type r if and only if xi,r = 1. Thus, if x3,A is equal to 1,
it means that the third auctioned item is of type A. We require that at every index i at
most one item type is auctioned, and that the total number of auctioned items of type r
is equal to the number nr of type r items in I .∑
r∈R xi,r = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n∑
1≤i≤n xi,r = nr for all r ∈ R
Any assignment of ones and zeros to the x variables that satisfies these two types
of constraints corresponds to a valid ordering of the items in I . The value of such an
ordering is determined by the learned regression models.
Translating feature values In order to compute the prediction of a regression model,
we not only need to translate the models into ILP constraints, but also the values of the
features used by these models. Feature 1, 2, 3, and 5 can be computed using linear
functions from the x variables:
soldi,r =
∑
j<i xj,r for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
diffi,r,r′ = soldi,r − soldi,r′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r, r′ ∈ R, r 6= r′
remaini,r =
∑
j>i xj,r for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
indexi = i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
For the fourth type of feature, we use an additional variable vj,r, which encodes
the expected value of the item auctioned at index j of type r. If the item at index j is
not of type r, vj,r is equal to 0. Since the v variables require the predictions (expected
values) as input, we provide their definition after defining the regression models.
sumi,r =
∑
1≤j≤i vj,r for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
To aid the ILP solver, we also pre-compute the minimum mf,i and maximum Mf,i
obtainable values of every feature f at every index i and provide these as bounds to the
solver.
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Constructing the objective function We aim to maximize the expected values vi,r:
max
∑
1≤i≤n
∑
r∈R vi,r
These vi,r are the predictions of the regression functions, defined later. Although it
is also possible to compute both the objective function and the sum values as very large
sums over the x and model variables (described next), specifying parts of these sums
as intermediate continuous v variables significantly reduces both the encoding size and
the computation time.
Finally, we discuss how to encode the learned regression tree and the linear regres-
sion model as the constraints in the ILP model.
Encoding regression trees We translate the regression tree models into ILP using
carefully constructed linear functions. Our encoding only requires one new set of
{0, 1} variables zi,l,r, representing whether a leaf node l is reached for item type r
at index i. The internal (decision) nodes of the trees can be represented implicitly by
the constraints on these new z variables. Intuitively, we encode that a z variable has to
be false when the binary test of any of its parent nodes fails. By additionally requiring
that exactly one z variable is true at every index, we fully encode the learned regression
trees.
Let Dr be the set of all decision nodes in the regression tree for type r. Every
decision node in Dr contains a boolean constraint f ≤ c, which is true if and only if
feature f has a value less than or equal to a constant c. A key insight of our encoding is
that every such boolean constraint directly influences the value of several z variables:
if it is true (at index i), then all z variables representing leafs in the right subtree are
false; if it is false, then all that represent leafs in the left subtree are false. In this way,
we require only two constraints per boolean constraint in order to represent all possible
paths to leaf nodes.
fvf,i + (Mf,i − c) ·
∑
l∈L zi,l,r ≤Mf,i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R, (f ≤ c) ∈ Dr
fvf,i + (mf,i − c) ·
∑
l∈L′ zi,l,r ≥ mf,i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R, (f ≤ c) ∈ Dr
where fvf,i is a calculation of feature value f for index i, L and L′ are the leaf nodes in
the left and right subtrees of the decision node with constraint (f ≤ c) in the regression
tree for type r, and Mf,i and mf,i are the maximum and minimum values of feature
f at index i. For the feature calculation we simply replace fvf,i with the right-hand
sides of the corresponding feature definitions.5
The above constraints ensure that when zi,l,r obtains a value of 1, all of the binary
test in the parent nodes on the path to l in the tree for type r return true at index i. By
construction of the regression trees, this ensures that at most one z variable is true for
every type r and index i. We require however that exactly one z variable is true at every
5We ignore the possibility that a feature f is equal to c because, since features have a limited precision,
we can always replace the constants in a decision node with one that cannot be obtained by f , without
changing its behavior.
12
index.6 This z has to be of the same type as the item sold at index i, denoted by the x
variables: ∑
l zi,l,r = xi,r for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
This completes our encoding of the regression trees. The predictions of the trees at
every index i are given by the z variable that is true for index i. We multiply this z vari-
able with the constant prediction in the leaf node it represents to obtain the prediction,
and store it in the v variables used to compute the sum feature values.
vi,r =
∑
l∈Lr cl,r · zi,l,r, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
where cl,r is the constant prediction of leaf l in the tree for type r.
We now discuss how to encode a linear regression model.
Encoding linear regression model Due to its linear nature, implementing linear re-
gression in ILP is very straightforward. We can directly compute the value of the v
variables using the linear predictor function:
vi,r =
∑
f∈Feat cf,r · fvf,i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
where Feat is the set of all features, fvf,i is feature f ’s values at index i, and cf,r
is the constant coefficient for feature f in the regression function for type r. The only
somewhat difficult part is that at every index, the used regression function can change
depending on the auctioned item type r. We implemented this choice using indicator
functions in CPLEX.7 This changes the above formulation as follows:
xi,r = 1 → vi,r =
∑
f∈Feat cf,r · featf,i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
xi,r = 0 → vi,r = 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r ∈ R
It states that if xi,r is true, then the values of vi,r is determined using the regres-
sion function. Otherwise, its value is 0. These are the only constraints needed to fully
implement a linear regression function. When using LASSO regularization, some co-
efficients will receive the value 0. These are removed from the encoding, making the
models smaller and easier to evaluate in the solver.
Now the two ILP models are complete and ready to solve the OOSA problem. We
give the following example to illustrate how the formulation of ILP works given learned
regression trees.
Example 3 Given the learned trees in Example 2, suppose we are asked to order a new
multiset of items {r1, r2, r2}. We translate this new set, together with the learned trees
into the following integer linear program with the following {0, 1} decision variables
(for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3): xi,r1 , xi,r2 , zi,1,r1 , zi,2,r1 , zi,1,r2 :
6Counterintuitively, it can occur that the objective function (discussed below) is maximized when every z
variable is false at an index i. If a small sum is needed to reach a high revenue prediction, it can be beneficial
to auction but not sell an item.
7Many other solvers have similar constructions. If not, these constraints can be implemented using a
‘big-M’ formulation, similar to the one we use to determine the value of the z variables in the regression tree
formulation.
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max
∑
1≤i≤3 vi,r1 + vi,r2
where vi,r1 = 4zi,1,r1
and vi,r2 = 5zi,1,r2 + 4zi,2,r2
subject to (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3)
x1,r1 + x2,r1 + x3,r1 = 1
x1,r2 + x2,r2 + x3,r2 = 2
xi,r1 + xi,r2 = 1
This denotes that exactly one x variable is true at every index i, 2 x variables are true
for item type r2, and 1 for type r1. This encodes all possible orderings. From this we
compute the feature values (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3):
soldi,r1 = x1,r1 + . . .+ xi−1,r1
soldi,r2 = x1,r2 + . . .+ xi−1,r2
that are used in the constraints denoting the Boolean tests in the internal nodes:
soldi,r2 + (100− 0.5)zi,1,r1 ≤ 100
soldi,r2 + (−0.5)zi,2,r1 ≥ 0
soldi,r1 + (100− 0.5)zi,1,r2 ≤ 100
soldi,r1 + (−0.5)zi,2,r2 ≥ 0
where Msold,i = 100 and msold,i = 0. The first two constraints encode that if
zi,1,r1 = 1, soldi,r2 ≤ 0.5; and if zi,2,r1 = 1, soldi,r2 ≥ 0.5. Thus, if a z variable
is true for a leaf, then all the Boolean tests of internal nodes on the path from the root
to that leaf have to succeed. The last two constraints are the same constraints for the
second tree. At last, we require that exactly one z variable is true at every index:
zi,1,r1 + zi,2,r1 = xi,r1 ,
zi,1,r2 + zi,2,r2 = xi,r2 .
A satisfying assignment to the x variables is x1,r1 , x2,r2 , x3,r2 set to 1, the rest to 0,
corresponding to the ordering r1r2r2. Since sold1,r2 = 0, this leads to 99.5z1,1,r1 ≤
100 and −0.5z1,2,r1 ≥ 0, forcing z1,2,r1 = 0. Since z1,1,r1 + z1,2,r1 = x1,r1 = 1, this
implies z1,1,r1 = 1. For the next index, we have sold2,r1 = 1, giving 99.5z2,1,r2 ≤ 99
and −0.5z2,2,r2 ≥ −1, and therefore forcing z2,1,r2 = 0 and z2,2,r2 = 1. Similarly,
we obtain z3,2,r2 = 1. This results in an objective value of 4 + 4 + 4 = 12.
2
4.2 A black-box heuristic: best-first search algorithm
We also provide a black-box heuristic for solving the ordering problem, see also [21].
The traditional method to overcome the computational blowup caused by sequential
decision making is to use a dynamic programming method. Although this lessens
the computational load by combining the different paths that lead to the same sets
of auctioned items, the search space is still too large and waiting for a solution will
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Algorithm 1 Black-box heuristic for solving OOSA: best-first search
Require: A set of items S, historical data on orderings and their values D, a maximum number
of iterations m
Ensure: Returned is a good (high expected value) ordering
Transform D into a data set
for every item type r do
Learn a regression model from D for predicting the value of item type r
end for
Initialize a hashtable H and a priority queue Q
Add the empty data row to Q
while Q is not empty and the size of H is less than m do
Pop the row of features F with highest value v from Q
if H does not contain F with a value ≥ v then
Add F with value v to H
Let L be the set of remaining items in F
for every item type r of items in L do
Let ik be an item of Type r in L
Let L′ be a random ordering of L− ik
Use the models to evaluate the value v′ of auctioning the ordering ikL′ after F
Create new features F ′ for auctioning ik after F
Add F ′ to Q with value v + v′
end for
end if
end while
return The highest evaluated ordering
take too long. Instead, we therefore employ a best-first search strategy that can be
terminated anytime in order to return the best found solution so far. We show how this
best-first search strategy works in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm uses a hashtable and a priority queue. The hashtable is used to
exclude the possibility of visiting the same nodes twice if the obtained value is less
than before (just like a dynamic programming method). These dynamic programming
cuts are sensible but lose optimality as on rare occasions it could be better to sell earlier
items for less, leaving more budget for the remaining ones. The priority queue provides
promising candidate nodes for the best-first strategy. By computing random orderings
of the remaining items, the learned models can evaluate complete orderings of all items.
The best one found is stored and returned if the algorithm is terminated. Unfortunately,
this does not result in an admissible heuristic for an A* search procedure. Hence, even
if the algorithm pops a solution from the queue, this is not necessarily optimal. In our
experience, using random orderings of the remaining items in this heuristic provides a
good spread over the search space. Although some nodes can be ‘unlucky’ and obtain
a bad ordering of the remaining items, there are always multiple ways to reach nodes
in the search space and it is very unlikely that all possibilities will be ‘unlucky’.
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4.3 White-box or black-box optimization?
The main difference between the two abovementioned approaches (see Figure 1) is
that the white-box method specifies the predictors entirely as constraints, which can
be used to infer bounds on the predictions and cut the search space. The black-box
method instead uses the predictors as oracles and is ignorant as to how the predictions
are made, which are naturally more efficient to compute but cannot be used to infer
search space cuts, i.e., to deduce that one ordering is better than another without testing
both of them. Another key difference is that the white-box method results in a single
optimization model that can be run in any modern solver, while the black-box method
requires the use of executable code to produce the predictions. In the black-box setting,
it is therefore much harder to use the powerful solving methods available in dedicated
solvers for problems such as integer linear optimization (ILP), satisfiability (SAT), or
constraint programming (CP). Instead, general search methods can be used such as
best-first search, beam-search, meta-heuristics, genetic algorithms, etc.
Both black-box and white-box approaches have their advantages. The main advan-
tage of black-box is that its performance is for a large part independent of the com-
plexity of the used regression model. In contrast, by explicitly modeling the regression
model as constraints in a white-box, more complex regression models lead to many
more constraints, which can dramatically increase in the time needed to solve it. An-
other advantage of black-box optimization is that it is easy to include additional cuts
such as the dynamic programming cuts discussed above. Such cuts can be added as
constraints in an LP formulation, but this can lead to a blow-up in runtime.
The main benefit of using the white-box approach is the use of modern exact solvers
instead of a heuristic search. These solvers use (amongst others) advanced branch-
and-bound methods to cut the search space, compute and optimize a dual solution,
and can prove optimality without testing every possible solution. Since Our white-
box constructions can also be easily integrated into existing (I)LP formulations that
have been used in a wide range of applications in for instance Operations Research.
In this way, one can combine the vast amount of expert knowledge available in these
applications with the knowledge in the readily available data. Our white-box method
is the first we know of that makes the results of machine learning directly available to
mathematical modeling in this fashion.
The most important downside of white-box is that an evaluation of translated mod-
els likely requires more time than running the code as a black-box, especially when the
models or features are somewhat complex. In our opinion, however, the advantages of
white-box optimization largely outweigh those of black-box optimization and make it
a very interesting topic for research in machine learning and optimization. In the next
section, we compare these two modeling approaches and investigate this trade-off by
applying them to OOSA.
5 Experiments
Designing an optimal ordering for sequential auctions is difficult with heterogeneous
bidders, as they may value items differently, have different budget constraints, and
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moreover, bid rationally or irrationally with various bidding strategies. To evaluate
the performance of the proposed optimization methods, ideally, we should collect real
auction data, build the optimization models, run real-world auctions with real bidders
using different ordering of items produced by different methods, and then compare the
resulting revenues. Since this evaluation method is not feasible for us, nor is it the
main purpose of this paper, we opted for a widely accepted evaluation approach in
research community, that is, we created an auction simulator which simulates auctions
with agents. We used this simulator to generate auction data sets, and to evaluate the
proposed method. An overview of this process is given in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Our framework for evaluating optimization using learned models for OOSA.
There is a simulator that is used in two ways: to generate historic data and to evaluate
the OOSA solutions. A train set and a few unseen problem instances are generated.
The train set is used to learn the regression models. Random orderings of the problem
instances are used to test them. The instances together with the learned models are
provided as input to the ILP-based white-box optimization and the best-first black-box
optimization. The resulting orderings are evaluated using the learned models, and using
simulator runs.
5.1 The simulator
Simulating auctions We simulate several sequential auction settings with the simula-
tor: (i) first price auctions where agents bid their reservation prices (agents’ reservation
prices are lower than their valuations), as in [11]; (ii) second price sealed bid auctions
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(i.e. Vickrey auctions [22]), where agents bid truthfully on each item based on their
valuation functions, as in [6] 8; (iii) Vickrey auctions where agents bid smartly, i.e.,
they compare the utility obtained at the end of the auction when buying and not buying
the item and place a bid based on the difference (see Section 5.4 for more details).
On the last auctioned item, they bid truthfully9. Given all bids on an item, the highest
bid wins. If multiple agents have the same true value, one of these is selected as win-
ner uniformly at random. With these different auction settings, we intend to show our
method is robust to the actual auction format and bidding strategies.
Item types We use a given set of 8 items to initialize the auction simulator. Every
type gets assigned an average value of 25+(5 · i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, and a reserve price of
1
2 (25+ (5 · i)). Every type is assigned popularity and sparsity values, drawn uniformly
from [2, 10]. The popularity value measures the degree of desirability of the item type
by the agents. The sparsity is a measure for the frequency that an item type is sold. In
every auction, 40 items are generated using a roulette wheel drawing scheme using the
sparsity values.
Bidder agents The simulator starts with 20 randomly generated bidding agents. Ev-
ery such agent gets assigned a budget between 50 and 250 uniformly at random. They
may desire 1 to 5 of the 8 item types, where popular types have a higher probability
of being selected, drawn using a roulette wheel selection on the item types’ popularity
values. For bidding in first-price auctions, every desired item type assigned to an agent
is also given a reservation price of u · v, where v is the average value of that type, and
u is a uniform random value between 0.5 and 2.0. The following is an example of five
agents generated for the experiments:
budget v(r1) v(r2) v(r3) v(r4) v(r5) v(r6) v(r7) v(r8)
123 59
141 78 81 41 115
130 32 21 80 25 36
126 32 53 28 36
182 51 93
Training For a given set of 20 random bidders, the simulator generates 1000 histor-
ical auctions. The 40 items in these auctions are generated using the above scheme,
and ordered randomly. These items are run in the simulator, where the agents use the
above-mentioned bidding strategies to decide what value to bid, in order to determine
the winners and the item selling prices. The total selling price of all items in one
sequential auction is the collected revenue. For the 20 generated bidders, we first ex-
periment the effect of different item orderings on the collected revenue by trying 100
random orderings and comparing the smallest, median, and largest collected revenue.
If the difference between the largest and smallest is less than one tenth of the median
8Note that in sequential Vickrey auctions with budget constrained agents, truth-telling is not an equilib-
rium bidding strategy (see [23]). To the best of our knowledge, how to compute the equilibrium bidding
strategy in realistic auction settings is an open problem.
9Vickrey [22] showed it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to bid their true values for the last
auctioned item.
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revenue, 20 new bidders are generated. This process is repeated until we find a set of
agents that passes this check, which typically occurs after a few iterations. By perform-
ing this check, we remove irrelevant problem instances. For the 20 agents that pass this
check, we generate 1000 auctions of 40 items and simulate these auctions together with
the agents. The resulting sequences of item-price pairs are then transformed to the fea-
tures discussed in Section 3, and the resulting data set is used to train the regression
trees and linear regressors.
Testing For the same set of 20 bidders, we generate 5 sets of 40 items, which are
used for testing. First, the regressors are tested by comparing their predictions with the
revenues generated by the simulator on 50 random orderings of each of these item sets.
Second, we translate each of the item sets into constraints for both the black-box and
white-box optimization solvers. The best ordering found by these solvers are compared
based on their values on the regression model, and in the simulator.
5.2 Experimental setup
In each experiment, we generate agents and items as described above. We use an
implementation of regression trees and LASSO from the scikit-learn machine learning
module [20] in Python to learn (and evaluate) the regressors. We learn trees of different
depths of 3, 5, 8 (we call them tree3, tree5, tree8), and we set the minimum
number of samples required to split an internal node to 10. The LASSO regressor is run
with 3 different values for α: 1.0, 0.1, and 0.000001 (lasso1, lasso2, lasso3).
The resulting trees and linear models then get translated to ILP, which in turn gets
solved by an ILP-solver (CPLEX [24]). In addition, we provide the solver with an
initial solution (the best of 1000 random orderings) in order to start the search, and set
the focus of the solver to finding integer feasible solutions. We set a time limit on the
ILP solver of 15 minutes for each instance using a single thread on an Intel core i-5
with 8GB RAM and record the best ordering of items that the ILP solver has obtained.
The last minute is spent on solution polishing (a local search procedure in CPLEX).
We apply our best-first search method on the same problem instances with the same
running time limit.
Evaluations There are two levels of evaluations involved in our problem. Firstly,
we determine the quality of the learned regressors, as they influence the quality of the
solution after optimization. For this, we tested different regression trees with different
maximum depths and linear regression models with different parameters.
Next, the optimization methods are evaluated in terms of the quality of the predicted
revenue. The optimization methods that we compare include the proposed white-box
ILP model which finds a solution based on the abovementioned 6 regression models,
the proposed black-box best-first search which evaluates a solution based on the 6
regression models, and in addition, two other simple ordering methods: (i) auctioning
the most valuable item first (i.e., mvf), as suggested in [11]; and (ii) a random ordering
strategy (i.e., mean5000), as seen in many real-world auctions for the purpose of
fairness.
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It is not feasible for us to compute the best solution given the problem size. Thus,
we obtain a lower bound on the optimal solution as follows: given a set of items, we
generate 5000 random orderings, and we use the true model (i.e., the simulator) to
evaluate them and pick the one returning the highest revenue. We use the mean value
of these 5000 random orderings as the output of the random ordering strategy.
We evaluate the 15 ordering methods in two ways:
• Model evaluation: we use the learned regression models to evaluate the solutions
returned by the ordering methods to compute the predicted revenues.
• Actual evaluation: we run auctions with the solutions (i.e., orderings) returned
by the ordering methods in our simulator to obtain the corresponding revenues.
Note that such an evaluation is possible only when a simulator is available.
There are in total three sets of experiments presented in this paper.
1. In the first set of experiments, we simulate first price auctions where agents bid
and pay (if winning) their reservation prices.
2. In the second set of experiments, the simulator runs Vickrey auctions where
agents bid their true values on each item and the winner pays the second highest
bid, or the reserve price if (s)he is the only bidder.
3. In the third set of experiments, the simulator runs Vickrey auctions and agents
bid smartly based on their expected utility at the end of the auction (see 5.4).
5.3 Experiment 1
Table 2: The frequencies of wins of 300 runs for each method against others (row
method vs column method), evaluated in the simulator.
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tree5bf 142 163 97 0 105 122 94 134 74 118 90 115 238 16 241 2037
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lasso1lp 193 226 150 202 160 183 0 185 113 178 136 170 263 38 269 2756
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lasso3lp 214 231 169 204 167 188 155 201 126 184 0 189 257 36 281 2899
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mvf 68 73 51 61 38 48 36 65 34 55 41 54 0 9 123 982
best5000 282 284 268 284 277 271 257 280 255 278 252 280 291 0 299 4158
mean5000 57 65 27 58 13 30 31 48 12 26 18 24 174 1 0 864
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Figure 4: R2 scores for different learning models for 60 different sets of agents. The
observed values are those returned by the simulator. Each score is computed from
10000 values. The results are presented in ascending order of the scores of lasso1.
We generate 60 sets of agents. For each set of agents we generate and run new sets
of items 5 times. This results in 300 models for each learning method.
We first report the performance of the learned trees and linear models in terms of
prediction accuracy. Given the same set of items as used during learning, we randomly
generate 50 permutations of these items as orderings and compute the predicted valued
of these orderings using the learned models. Thus, for every set of agents, there are
50×5×40 = 10000 bids to predict. These predictions are compared with the evaluated
values of the orderings by the simulator. We report the coefficients of determination, or
R2 scores, in Figure 4. This coefficient is a standard measure for comparing regression
models and is defined as:
R2 = 1−
∑
1≤d≤k(v
d − v(fd1 , . . . , fdm))2∑
1≤d≤k(vd − mean(v))2
,
where k is the number of samples, vd is the dth data value (simulator evaluation),
v(fd1 , . . . , f
d
m) the predicted value, and mean(v) the mean of all data values. A large
value (close to 1.0) means the regressor is an almost perfect predictor, and smaller
values indicate worse performance. Figure 4 shows that all regression models lead to
good prediction, with the lowest R2 score over 0.85. The learned trees with depth 8
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give the best performance, followed by the trees with depth 5. Intuitively a larger tree
may give a better prediction. The scores of lasso2 and lasso3 are very similar,
and slightly better than lasso1. This result makes sense since LASSO with a higher
regularization parameter α (i.e., lasso1) implies the use of less features, and hence,
may have less prediction power. The tree with depth 3 shows much worse performance
than the larger trees, and it is on average worse than the three linear regression models.
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Figure 5: The performance of the different ordering methods evaluated by the simu-
lator, compared to mean5000. The simulated auctions are first-price auctions. Each
box contains 300 values.
We now discuss the actual performance of the different ordering methods. After
every ordering method returns its best ordering, these orderings are then evaluated in
the simulator to get corresponding revenues. As we ran 300 different instances (60
sets of different agents, each with 5 sets of different items), each method has 300 such
revenues. We calculate the frequencies of wins by comparing the revenues in pairs
in Table 2. One obvious conclusion from the table is that the ordering heuristic mvf
(i.e., most valuable item first) performs worst, regardless of which method it compared
to. In fact, this heuristic performed even worse than the random ordering strategy
mean5000 (123 wins vs. 174).10 This result contradicts the theoretical finding that
10Notice that there is one instance where mean5000 is better than best5000. This is due to the random
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was concluded using much simpler auction settings. Another observation is that given
the learned models, the developed white-box methods win over the black-box methods
more than half of the time. This holds consistently for all 12 proposed methods (wins
lp vs. bf: 171, 197, 178, 185, 195, 189). It shows that our new way of utilizing the
internal structure of the learned models for optimization is promising.
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Figure 6: The performance difference between the LP model and the best-first search,
evaluated by the predictive model. Each box contains 300 values. The simulated auc-
tions are first-price auctions.
If we look at the results of the white-box methods built from the learned regression
trees, i.e., tree3lp, tree5lp, tree8lp, we notice that tree5lp and tree8lp
performed similarly and they are slightly better than tree3lp. This result is consis-
tent with the higher R2 scores of the larger trees. Interestingly, despite their lower R2
scores, the linear regression LP methods return good orderings especially lasso2lp
and lasso3lp which are on average better than the three regression tree LP models.
These are further confirmed with Figure 5, which depicts the revenue differences in
the simulator between the ordering methods and mean5000. It is more obvious from
scheme that we used in selecting winners who give two identical bids. Consequently, evaluating the same
ordering twice in the simulator may result in two different revenues. We want to point out that this does not
happen often and the effect is often negligible.
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Figure 7: The performance difference between the values evaluated by the model and
the values evaluated by the simulator. Each box contains 300 values. The simulated
auctions are first-price auctions.
this figure that the proposed linear regression LP models are the better optimization
methods than the tree LP models in practice. We believe that this is due to the cas-
cading inaccuracies, caused by the sum feature that relates the predicted value to the
predictions of earlier auctioned items (see discussions in Section 3.3). Due to the crisp
boundaries in regression trees, the effect of these errors on the solution evaluation is
much greater than using linear regressors. We believe the effect is smaller for larger
trees because they are more accurate.
Figure 6 shows the performance difference between the LP model and the best-
first search, which are built upon the same learned regression model. The solutions
are evaluated using the predictive models. The value differences between the white-
box and the black-box methods are more significant on smaller trees than on bigger
trees (tree3 vs tree5 vs tree8), and on linear models with higher regularization
parameter than on lower regularization parameter (lasso1 vs lasso2 vs lasso3).
This trend shown in the results is somehow expected. The smaller tree leads to a
smaller LP model, which is easier to optimize by the solver and consequently gives
a much better performance than the best-first search. Similarly, the linear regression
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with a higher regularization parameter α implies less feature values to compute during
white-box optimization, and therefore, its advantage over the black-box method is more
obvious than lasso2 and lasso3 which are with smaller values of α.
We observe that all white-box LP methods are better than the black-box methods,
except the LP models resulting from the trees with depth 8. The depth 8 regression
trees perform better for best-first search when evaluated on the model (Figure 6), but
better for LP when evaluated in the simulator (see Figure 5). The most likely reason for
the strange behavior of the depth 8 trees is that the best-first search outperforms LP on
harder to predict instances.11 Intuitively, because harder-to-predict instances typically
result in larger models, they are harder to optimize in CPLEX. We checked this cause
by investigating whether the R2 scores of the depth 8 regression tree are correlated
with which method performing better in the model evaluation. The mean of these R2
scores are 0.950 when the LP performs better, and 0.942 when the best-first performs
better. Although this difference seems small, it is significant.
Moreover, the small difference in R2 scores between trees with depth 5 and depth
8 also has a significant effect on the difference between their model and simulator eval-
uations (e.g., due to cascading errors). To demonstrate this, we report in Figure 7 the
solution differences of the same ordering methods when being evaluated by the model
and the simulator. The purpose of this comparison is to test whether the predicted
outcome (using learned models) corresponds to the actual outcome (using simulator).
This test is important as in general, there are no simulators available to evaluate the
solutions. The figure demonstrates that the linear regression based optimization meth-
ods return more reliable solutions, i.e., their solutions evaluated on the learned linear
models are closer to the solution values returned by the simulator. Note that it is log-
ical that most values are over estimated because we the optimization tries to solve a
maximization problem. The trees with depth 5 and 8 show a significant difference in
this evaluation. The depth 3 trees end up with the highest evaluation difference, and
overestimate the solution values the most.
5.4 Experiment 2 and 3
In order to demonstrate that our method of auction optimization using learned models
is robust to the used auction rule or the bidding strategies, we test it in a second-price
auction in Experiment 2, and with smart agents in Experiment 3. We generate 10 sets
of agents. For each set of agents we run new sets of items 5 times. Figures 8 and 9
show the same plots for these settings as Figures 5 and 6 for the setting in the first
experiment.
In the second experiment, we test with truthful-telling bidders in second-price auc-
tions. The only difference with the setting in the first experiment is that here agents
bid their true values on the items and pay an amount equal to the second highest bid,
or the reserve price if there is only one bidder. As Figure 8 shows, the results are very
11Another possible cause is that the LP solver makes small rounding errors. Such errors are unavoidable
because using both very small and very large coefficients and/or precision in one problem formulation can
cause numerical instability. We therefore round the mean values of the leaf predictions to two digits after
the decimal point in the regression tree models before translating it to LP. Unfortunately, due to the crisp
decision boundaries in regression trees, these small errors can sometimes have a large effect.
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Figure 8: Performance of the different ordering methods with second-price auctions
and truth-telling, myopic agents. The two figures show the performance evaluated by
the simulator and the model respectively. Each box contains 50 values.
similar to those in the first experiments: (1) all methods outperform the naive ordering
strategies from the literature, (2) the white-box outperforms the black-box methods,
and (3) the linear regression models perform best. However, the difference between
the best performing methods tree5 and lasso2 is no longer significant.
In the third experiment, we test with smart agents that aim to maximize their final
utility in a second-price auction. Specifically, when deciding what value to bid on the
current item ri, they have access to the auction simulator and use it to run the remaining
items I ′ \ ri. For computational reasons, when running the remaining items I ′ \ ri, it is
assumed that every agent bids truthfully and pays according to the second-price rule in
these runs. For every bid ri, they run the simulator twice: once in the situation where
they bid the item ri with their reservation prices (run1), and once where they do not
buy the item (run2). They then decide what value to bid according to the following
rules:
• If after run2 the agent has a remaining budget greater than its value for the
item, it bids truthfully. The intuition is that it is better to buy an item than to have
remaining budget.
• Else, if the total utility after run2 is less than after run1, it also bids truthfully.
When it is better to buy an item, try to obtain it.
• Else, it bids its true value minus the difference in utility after run2 and run1.
When it is xmonetary units better to not buy an item, try to obtain it for the value
minus x.
Using these rules, the agents bid the highest value that they expect will give them an
increase in utility.
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Figure 9: Performance of the different ordering methods with second-price auctions
and smart agents. The two figures show the performance evaluated by the simulator
and the model respectively. Each box contains 50 values.
As can be seen in Figure 9, also in this challenging setting, our method performs
significantly better than the naive ordering rules from the literature. There is however
a much larger variance in the performance of the different methods, causing the dif-
ference between black-box and white-box to be insignificant in the simulator. When
evaluated on the model, however, white-box is still better than black-box in all cases
except tree8. An interesting final observation is that, with these smart agents, the
mvf method does seem to perform slightly better than mean5000 (although not sig-
nificantly), while in the other experiments it performed consistently worse.
6 Comparison to related work
We discuss related works and how our work contributes to and from several related
research communities.
6.1 Interplay between mathematical optimization and machine learn-
ing
Many studies have investigated the interplay of data mining and machine learning with
mathematical modeling techniques, see overview in e.g. [25, 26, 27]. Most of these in-
vestigate how to use data mining to estimate the value of parameters in decision making
models or to replace decision model structure when it cannot be fully determined from
the hypotheses at hand. For instance, Brijs et al. [28] build a decision model as an inte-
ger program that maximizes product assortment of a retail store. The decision model is
then refined by incorporating additional decision attributes that are the learned patterns
from recorded sales data. Li and Olafsson [3] use a decision tree to learn dispatching
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rules that are then used to decide which job should be dispatched first. These dispatch-
ing rules are previously unknown, and it is assumed that it is worthwhile to capture
the current practices from previous data. Gabel and Riedmiller [1] model production
scheduling problem as multi-agent reinforcement learning where each agent makes its
dispatching decisions using a reinforcement learning algorithm based on a neural net-
work function approximation.
Another line of work investigates how to use learning techniques during optimiza-
tion in order to learn properties of good solutions. For instance, Defourny et al. [30]
combine the estimation of statistical models for returning a decision rule given a state
with scenario tree techniques from multi-stage stochastic programming. This line of
work shares similarities with the field of black-box optimization, see, e.g., [14, 15, 31].
In black-box optimization, methods are used to approximate a function with unknown
analytical form and which typically is expensive to execute. In contrast, in multi-stage
stochastic programming this form is known but stochastic. An often applied technique
for black-box optimization is the use of surrogate methods, see, e.g., [32]. Surrogates
are approximations of the black-box function that are less expensive to execute, typical
examples include linear/polynomial regression, neural networks, and other methods
from machine learning. These functions are trained during optimization from (as few
as possible) black-box function calls.
As learning tasks can lead to challenging optimization problems, researchers have
also applied mathematical optimization methods in order to increase learning effi-
ciency. For instance, Bennett et al. [33] use linear programming for determining linear
combination splits within two-class decision trees. Chang et al. [29] propose a Con-
strained Conditional Model (CCM) framework to incorporate domain knowledge into a
conditional model for structured learning, in the form of declarative constraints. CCMs
solve prediction problems. In [34], the authors build a mixed integer program for multi-
class data classification. A comprehensive overview of optimization techniques used
in learning is given in [35]. Researchers are also interested in using mathematical op-
timization methods in order to find entire models and rules, see e.g., [36, 37, 38].
Our approach fits in the first line of research of this interplay. The proposed best-
first search method uses regression models to learn good orderings, which is then ap-
plied during search to evaluate the solutions of OOSA. Hence, similar to the existing
work, the models learned from data are used in a black-box fashion. This approach
shares similarities with surrogate methods for black-box optimization. An important
difference is that the (surrogate) models here are learned from data.
Furthermore, different from the existing work, our proposed white-box optimiza-
tion method makes all the properties of the learned models visible to the optimization
solver. To the best of our knowledge, this way of using the results of machine learning
is entirely novel. Moreover, it realizes the construction of an optimization model auto-
matically from data, providing a new way of modeling in mathematical optimization.
6.2 Sequence models
As an auction ordering is essentially a sequence of items, our work is also related to
the many machine learning approaches for sequence modeling. However, to the best of
our knowledge none of the existing sequence models fits our auction setting. Language
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models such as deterministic automata [39] are too powerful since they can model
every possible sequence independently and therefore require too much data to learn
accurately. Short sequence models such as hidden Markov models or N-grams [40] do
not model the dependence on items sold a long time (more than the sliding window
length) before.
Markov decision processes (MDPs) (see, e.g., [41]) may be closest to our auction
setting, as they can directly model the expected price per item and come with methods
that can be used to optimize the expected total reward (revenue). However, we notice
that a straightforward implementation of the auction design problem as an MDP is not
possible. Let us try to model auction design as an MDP. Because of the Markov as-
sumption, every state in this MDP has to contain all the relevant information for the
auctioneer’s decision on which item to auction: the set of available items, the bidders’
valuation functions, budgets and strategies, and for every bidder the items (s)he al-
ready possesses. In every state q of this process, the auctioneer can choose what item i
to put to auction from a multiset of available items I . The next state q′ resulting from
auctioning item i depends on the bidders and their valuations. These are unknown
to the auctioneer, but probabilities can be used to estimate them. These probabilities
Pi(q, q
′) provide a distribution over the possible next states and the corresponding re-
wardsRi(q, q′), given i is auctioned. In every possible next state q′, the set of available
items is equal to I −{i}, i.e., equal to the items in q minus the sold item i. The goal of
the auctioneer is to maximize the expected rewards (revenue) for a given set of items
I . In every state q, (s)he thus has to take an action (choosing an item) that maximizes
the sum of the expected rewards V (q, I) of items in I starting in state q:
V (q, I) = argmax
i∈I
∑
q′
Pi(q, q
′)Ri(q, q′) + V (q′, I − {i})
 .
In this equation, we separated I from q to highlight the major hurdle that needs to
be overcome in order to represent the auction design problem as an MDP. I needs to
be included in the MDP since it determines the set of available actions in every state.
However, since the set of items is finite this makes the MDP acyclic and at least as large
as the number of possible subsets of items from I (assuming the effect of their ordering
is represented differently), i.e., at least 2|I|. In order to learn the rewards and transition
probabilities, an auctioneer would therefore need an extremely large data sample.
This intuitively shows why it is difficult to represent the auction design problem as
an MDP. However, with a suitable factored representation of the states and/or function
approximation [41] of the rewards, it could be possible to represent our auction problem
as an MDP. In this case, a major hurdle will be to find a representation that results
in Markovian states, which is needed to apply the dynamic programming methods.
Since the problem of deciding whether good auction ordering exists is NP-complete
(Theorem 1), and these methods run in polynomial time, this is impossible without
an exponentially large state space unless P = NP. Our method relies on solvers and
search methods for NP-complete problems, making a polynomial state space possible,
and therefore requiring much less data to estimate the model parameters.
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6.3 Auction design
In the auction literature, a few existing papers investigate the impact of ordering on
the performance of sequential auctions. One line of related research focuses on theo-
retical analysis. In the economics literature (see [8, 12, 11]), such theoretical studies
were typically carried out under very restricted markets. The main research focus there
is to analyze equilibrium bidding strategies of bidders who compete for (usually) two
items (heterogeneous or homogeneous), and then to gain insights on the impact of
ordering on the auction outcome based on derived bidding behaviours. For instance,
Elmaghraby [8] studies the influence of ordering on the efficiency of the sequential
second price procurement auctions, where a buyer outsources two heterogeneous jobs
to suppliers with capacity constraints. Suppliers can only win 1 job in this setting. The
author shows that specific sequences lower procurement costs and identifies a class
of bidders’ cost functions where the efficient orderings (i.e. the auction rewards the
jobs to the suppliers with the lowest total costs) and equilibrium bidding strategies
exist. Pitchik [12] points out that in the presence of budget constraints, a sealed-bid
sequential auction with two bidders and two goods may have multiple symmetric equi-
librium bidding functions, and the ordering of sale affects the expected revenue. If the
bidder who wins the first good has a higher income than the other one, the expected
revenue is maximized. Subramaniam and Venkatesh [11] investigate the optimal auc-
tioning strategy of a revenue-maximizing seller, who auctions two items, which could
be complements or substitutes. They show that when the items are different in value,
the higher valued item (among the two) should be auctioned first in order to increase
the seller’s revenue. A similar revenue-maximizing strategy is proposed by Benoit and
Krishna [42] in a complete information auction setting. The authors conclude that in
such a setting, when selling two items to budget constrained bidders, it is always better
to sell the more valued item first. However, this strategy does not optimize the revenue
anymore when more than two items are to be auctioned.
In the computer science literature, Elkind and Fatima [13] study how to maximize
revenue in sequential auctions with second-price sealed-bid rules, where bidders are
homogeneous, i.e., all their valuations are drawn from public known uniform distribu-
tions, they want to win only one item (but they can bid any of items). In this setting,
the authors analyze the equilibrium bids, and develop an algorithm that finds an op-
timal agenda (i.e., ordering). Vetsikas et al. [43] study a similar auction setting, but
unlike [13], they assume the valuations are known to the bidders at the beginning of the
auction. The focus of their work was to compute the equilibrium strategies for bidders.
Later, Vetsikas [23] analyzes the bidding strategies for budget constrained bidders in
sequential Vickrey auctions. However, it is a challenge to compute the equilibrium
strategies in practice.
Several empirical research has been conducted to test the theoretical findings in the
economics community. Grether et al. [9] report on a field experiment that tests the
ordering strategies of a seller in sequential, ascending automobile auctions. They con-
clude that the worst performing ordering in terms of revenue is for the seller to auction
vehicles from highest to lowest values. Raviv [10] uses an example to demonstrate that
there are cases where the ordering of the auction does not affect revenue using a sec-
ond price seal-bid auction. In his example, there are two heterogeneous items for sale
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among three risk neutral bidders. Raviv shows that when the ordering is randomized,
the expected selling price stays the same, no matter which one of the items is sold first.
We are not the first who consider learning from the previous auctions. However,
the difference lies in the fact that the most existing work study how bidders learn from
the past information, and update their bids. Boutilier et al. [44] propose a learning
model for bidders to update their bidding policies in sequential auctions for resources
with complementarities. The bidding strategies are computed based on the estimated
distribution over prices, that is modeled by dynamic programming. Goes et al. [45]
present an empirical study of real sequential online auctions. They analyze the data
from an online auction retailer, and show that bidders learn and update their willingness
to pay in repeated auctions of the same item. In [6], the authors show the benefits of
using earlier auction data for the management of sequential, multi-unit auctions, where
the seller needs to split its entire inventory into sequential auctions of smaller lots in
order to increase its profit. In their work, an auction feedback mechanism is developed
based on a Bayesian model, and it is used to update the auctioneer’s beliefs about the
bidders’ valuation distribution.
Our contribution to the auction literature lies on the fact that our approach can be
applied to design optimal auctions based on historical auction data. The advantage
of using machine learning and data mining methods is that they are robust to the un-
certainty (or noise), and hence have high potential to be applied to real-world auction
design. Moreover, the approach itself is general and can be applied to many different
auction optimization problems, such as finding best reserve price for items for sale, or
maximizing social welfare instead of revenue. The only necessary change is on the
selection of the features for learning regression models.
7 Conclusions and future work
Mathematical optimization relies on the availability of knowledge that can be used to
construct a mathematical model for the problem at hand. This knowledge is not al-
ways available. For instance, in multiagent problems, agents are autonomous and often
unwilling to share their local information. Frequently, this autonomy and private infor-
mation influence the outcome of the optimization, making finding an optimal solution
very difficult. In this paper, we adopt the idea of using machine learning techniques
to estimate these influences for an optimization problem with many unknowns: the
optimal ordering for sequential auctions (OOSA) problem.
We have demonstrated our approach by transforming historical auctions into data
sets for learning regression trees and linear regression models, which subsequently are
used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions. We proposed two
types of optimization methods with learned models, a black-box best-first search ap-
proach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned models to integer linear
programs (ILP). We built an auction simulator with a set of bidder agents to simulate
an auction environment. The simulator was used for generating historical auction data,
and for evaluating the orderings of items returned by our methods. We ran an extensive
set of experiments with different agents and bidding strategies. Although optimizing
the orderings in sequential auctions is a hard problem, our proposed methods obtained
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very high values, significantly outperforming the naive methods proposed in the liter-
ature. The experimental results also demonstrate the advantage of using the white-box
method for optimization, which significantly outperforms the black-box approach in
nearly all settings. In addition, they indicate that when the learned model becomes
more complex, it potentially results in more constraints and consequently, an increase
in the time needed to solve the problem in a white-box fashion. Since more complex
models are (potentially) better predictors, this shows a clear trade-off between model-
ing and optimization power in white-box optimization. In our opinion, the benefits of
the white-box approach largely outweigh the benefits of using black-box optimization.
Besides an improved performance, a very big benefit of the white-box formula-
tion is that it provides a new way of obtaining traditional mathematical models. Our
method therefore has many other potential application areas, especially in problems
where more and more data is being collected. Even in cases where there already ex-
ists a handcrafted optimization model, a model that is learned and translated using our
method can easily be integrated into existing (I)LP formulations in order to determine
part of the objective function based on data. In this way, one can combine the vast
amount of expert knowledge available in these domains with the knowledge in the
readily available data. We would like to investigate how such integration works in the
future.
We chose a relatively simple auction model for ease of explanation in this paper.
However, our approach works whenever regression models are able to provide reliable
predictions of the bidding values. Hence we believe it can be applied to other auction
formats with more complex valuation functions (i.e. combinatorial preferences [46])
and more complex bidding strategies. In the future, we plan to test our approach on
real auction data.
Our experiments also highlight some interesting properties of the white-box method.
Firstly, they show an improvement in performance when the number of features is re-
duced and/or the models are less complex. It would therefore be very interesting to
investigate the effect of pruning and feature selection or reduction on the performance
of our methods. Secondly, they show a tendency of the regression tree optimizer to
overestimate, i.e., find orderings that have a much higher expected revenue than its rev-
enue in practice. Intuitively, the solver abuses the crisp nature of the regression tree in
order to find a solution that satisfies exactly the right constraints. Part of the problem
is that, although these constraints are learned from data, and therefore uncertain, the
solver treats them as exact. Fortunately, there exists a long history of methods that try
to optimize in the presence of such uncertainties in the area of robust optimization, see,
e.g., [47]. In future work, we will investigate the potential uses of these techniques for
learned models.
Recently, regression tree models with linear models in the leaf nodes have also
been successfully used as black-box surrogate functions [48]. Since it is also straight-
forward to translate these trees given our two encodings (replace the leaf variables by
indicators for which linear function to use), it would be very interesting to investigate
the possibility of a white-box alternative.
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A Hardness of auction design using learned predictors
We show that using predictive models instead of agents with utility functions does not
reduce the complexity of the problem: it remains NP-complete for both regression trees
and linear regression predictors.
Lemma 1 Using regression trees, the problem of whether there exists an ordering that
has a total predicted value of at least K is NP-complete.
Proof 2 The proof follows from the fact that we can use simple regression trees to
model the preferences of the two agents from Theorem 1, and evaluating an ordering
using these trees can be done in polynomial time. The regression tree for every item
type ri is shown in Figure 10.
sum ≤∑ I
Type ri
sum ≤∑ I − v2(ri)
predict v2(ri)predict 0
predict v1(ri)
yes
yes no
no
Figure 10: The regression tree for every item type ri used to model a partitioning
problem.
Lemma 2 Using linear regression predictors, the problem of whether there exists an
ordering that has a total predicted value of at least K is NP-complete.
Proof 3 We prove the lemma using a construction for computing the value of a quadratic
function using only linear functions, the ordering problem, and our feature values. The
maximum value of this quadratic function is then forced to coincide with the solution of
a partition problem instance: Given a set of integers I = {v1, . . . , vn}, is I dividable
into two sets A and B such that
∑
A =
∑
B?
From the partition instance, let k = 12
∑
1≤i≤n vi, we construct the following items
and linear regression predictors (functions v()):
• n items of type x1 . . . xn, with v(xi) = vi − vi·sum(y)2k , and
• 1 item of type y, with v(y) = 2k −∑1≤i≤n sum(xi).
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The objective is to maximize
∑
1≤i≤n v(xi) + v(y). The corresponding decision prob-
lem is to ask whether there exists an ordering that achieves a value of 2 12k.
( ⇒) Let A,B be a partition of I such that ∑A = ∑B, and let a1, . . . , a|A| and
b1, . . . , b|B| be the corresponding items of type x1 . . . xn. The following ordering then
gives a value of
∑
1≤i≤n vi:
a1 . . . a|A| y b1 . . . b|B|
In this ordering,
∑
1≤i≤|A| v(ai) = k by definition of A and since sum(y) = 0 be-
fore item y is auctioned. Consequently,
∑
1≤i≤n sum(xi) =
∑
1≤i≤|A| v(ai) = k,
giving v(y) = 2k − k = k. ∑1≤i≤|A| v(a1) + v(y) thus already obtains the objec-
tive value of 2k, and therefore
∑
1≤i≤|B| v(b1) should be equal to
1
2k. By definition
of B,
∑
1≤i≤|B| v(bi) = k − k·sum(y)2k . Since v(y) = k, sum(y) = k, and thus∑
1≤i≤|B| v(bi) = k − k·k2k = k − k2 = 12k, proving that the ordering obtains a value
of 2 12k.
( ⇐) To prove the other direction, let us further analyse the relation between the
objective function
∑
1≤i≤n v(xi)+v(y) and the auction ordering. The only term in the
v(xi) predictors that depends on the ordering is sum(y), all other terms are constants.
This term is equal to zero for the xi items auctioned before y, and equal to v(y) for the
items auctioned after y. Similar to the (⇒) part, let a1, . . . , a|A| denote the xi items
before y, b1, . . . , b|B| those after y, and A,B the corresponding partition of items in
I . The objective value is then given by
∑
1≤i≤|A| v(ai) + v(y) +
∑
1≤i≤|B| v(bi). We
analyse these three parts in turn.
• ∑1≤i≤|A| v(ai) =∑vi∈A vi since sum(y) = 0 for these items.
• v(y) = 2k −∑1≤i≤|A| v(ai) = 2k −∑vi∈A vi =∑vi∈B vi.
• ∑1≤i≤|B| v(bi) = ∑vi∈B vi −∑vi∈B vi·v(y)2k , since v(y) = ∑vi∈B vi, this
becomes
∑
vi∈B vi −
v(y)2
2k .
Since
∑
vi∈A vi +
∑
vi∈B vi = 2k, the overall objective function is given by:
2k + v(y)− v(y)
2
2k
which is maximized when v(y) = k (for k > 0) with value 2k + k − k22k = 2 12k. This
exact value of v(y) = k is obtained when
∑
vi∈B vi = k. The sets A and B thus give
a partition of I .
Remarks. We proved the NP-completeness for the general case of Lemma 2. How-
ever, we do not know whether the complexity holds for more realistic valuation func-
tions that bidders have.
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